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IN RE 
I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
No. 15613 
This is an appeal from an Order Recommending Suspension 
of a lawyer by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar. 
The Order, together with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Hearing Committee was filed with the 
Supreme Court on January 13, 1978. Appellant filed his Notice 
of Appeal with the Supreme Court on February 9, 1978. 
DISPOSITION BEFORE THE UTAH STATE BAR 
On September 29, 1977, a Hearing Committee, consisting 
of three Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, conducted a dis-
ciplinary hearing of certain charges against appellant. The 
Hearing Committee filed Findings of Fact, Conclusions and· Re-
commendations with the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State 
Bar dated January 12, 1978. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
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and Recommendations were approved by the Board of Commissioners 
on January 13, 1978. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions st3.te 
that appellant violated Rule IV, Canon 5, DR5-105 of the Revised 
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, for the as-
serted reason that appellant was prevented from exercising inde-
pendent professional judgment on behalf of his client by reason 
of nis representing another client. Appellant was further found 
in violation of Rule IV, Canon 2, DR2-106 of the Revised Rules 
for the reason that the fee charged a particular client was ex-
cessive. 
RSLIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
~-------~~------
Appellant seeks review by the SupreJJe Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-19 (Repl. 1953), reversal of the Findings 
and Conclusions, rejection of the Order Recommending Suspension, 
and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
STATEME~T OF THE FACTS 
---·--------------
The facts developed in the hearing below are as follows: 
I. The complainant's init~~1_g_2nt~~ts_~it~~~ant. 
Appellant is an attorney licensed to practice law in the 
State of Utah, with offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. On or 
about December 27, 1975, appellant was contacted by Kay Lou 
Behunin on behalf of Kay Lou Chevrolet-Oldsmobile Company, a 
Utah corporation. Tr. 14, 49. The corporation had been served 
with process in a lawsuit filed in the District Court of Sevier 
-2-
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County, State of Utah, styled "Theodore H. Burr, Plaintiff, vs. 
Randall Johnson and Kay Lou Chevrolet Company, a corporation, 
Defendants, Civil No. 7147." Tr. 15; Ex. 24. Three indi-
viduals, Mrs. Behunin, the company's business manager, and the 
company's bookkeeper all met with appellant and delivered to him 
the company files and other documents which they thought were 
relevant to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Tr. 16, 52, 53. 
At the time, Mrs. Behunin was the president and sole stockholder 
of the corporation, and she had previously been an employee of 
the corpora ti on. Tr. 13. Theodore Burr, the plaintiff in the 
lawsuit, was a former owner of the dealership, and the lawsuit 
was in the nature of a breach of contract action seeking an 
accounting. Tr. 13' 54. Another former owner of the dealership 
(Randall Johnson) was named individually as a defendant, but 
Mrs. Behunin was not. 
Appellant indicated he would accept the case and that 
his fee would be $5,000, whether the action was tried or settled 
out of court. Tr. 16, 18. In setting his fee, appellant testi-
fied without contradiction that he considered the following 
facts: The suit was filed in Sevier County, some 263 miles from 
his office. The suit involved complicated facts and the amount 
in controversy was at least $25,000. Tr. 57, 59; Ex. 24, 20. A 
counterclaim and cross- claim appeared meritorious. Tr. 53; Ex. 
23. Plaintiff's records would have to be secured through 
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appropriate discovery procedures. Tr. 55. Depositions, includ-
ing those o f the p 1 a inti ff , p 1 a inti ff' s accountant , and the ct e-
f end ant Johnson appeared necessary. Tr. 55. The plaintiff and 
Mr. Johnson resided in Sevier County, and the accountant resided 
in Weber County. Tr. 55. Appellant further testified that he 
knew the case would involve travel expenses, both for discovery 
and trial, and that he expected to utilize an investigator to 
investigate the facts. Tr. 55. The fee was set as a flat fee. 
Tr. 56. It was intended to cover all expenses of litigation, 
including lawyers' services, depositions, motel bills, meals, 
mileage and the investigator's services. Tr. 56. The fee was 
$5,000 through trial -- ''win, lose or draw at any stage." Tr. 
58. 
Appellant does not usually keep records of time spent in 
his clients' behalf, nor does he bill his services on an hourly 
basis. Tr. 56. He often charges about $3,500 for a trial in 
the local district court. Tr. 57. Plaintiff's lawyer had pray-
ed for a fee in the sum of $3, 500, and he was a resident of 
Sevier County. Tr. 56. Appellant expected trial to last one or 
two days. Tr. 60. Consistent with the issues and expenses in-
volved, it was his opinion that $5,000 was a reasonable fee. 
Appellant testified that he spent well over fifty hours pre-
paring the case from December 27, 1975 until he was discharged. 
Tr. 117. 
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In fixing the fee, appellant also considered his experi-
ence, reputation and ability. He believed that the corporation 
came to him because of these factors, even though he resided in 
Salt Lake County and his services in Sevier County would involve 
additional expense. Tr. 62, 69, 115. Al though he did not meti-
culously ponder each of the factors enumerated in DR2-106(B) of 
the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar, 
he, in fact, did consider most of them. By check dated December 
29, 1975, Kay Lou Chevrolet-Oldsmobile paid appellant $5, 000. 
Ex. 22. 
Several weeks after the first meeting, Mrs. Behunin and 
the company's bookkeeper again met with appellant concerning the 
case. Tr. 18. Appellant reviewed legal research performed by 
other lawyers in his office. Tr. 63. He reviewed work per-
formed by an investigator, Mr. Lord. Tr. 64. He consulted with 
Mrs. Behunin and other employees of the company at his office 
and at the company's place of business in Salina, Utah. Tr. 65. 
He also met and consulted with Mrs. Behunin in Helper, Utah. 
Tr. 20, 65. There were phone calls and correspondence. Ex. 8, 
9, 1 O, 11 , 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19. Appellant filed an an-
swer, counterclaim and cross-complaint and had conferences with 
counsel for the plaintiff. Ex. 23. Mrs. Behunin wanted the 
case continued; and, since the continuances were appropriate and 
proper, the appellant moved for and obtained them. Tr. 90, 91, 
94; Ex. 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19. 
-5-
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II. ['!ct ~-1,J_QQ.~rly1:_Qg__1::.h§_'!l±.§g_ed _ ~<2Qfl!.~1::_Qf _if1terest 
'!12L1::l'l_§_~ll§.~s!_§XC§__~si V§__fee. ----
In the summer of 1976, Theodore Burr, plaintiff in the 
suit against Mrs. Behunin's corporation, was charged with crim-
inal violations in Sevier County. Tr. 69; Ex. 13. Mr. Burr was 
charged with receiving stolen property during a time subsequent 
to his involvement in the Chevrolet dealership. Tr. 70. Mr. 
Burr asked appellant to represent him in that criminal action. 
Also in the summer of 1976, Mrs. Behunin met with appel-
lant in Helper, Utah. The testimony of Mrs. Behunin and the 
appellant conflicts as to what was discussed at that time. Ao-
pellant testified that he and Mrs. Behunin discussed the charges 
against Mr. Burr and whether or not the criminal action could 
help or hurt the corporation in the lawsuit Mr. Burr had filed. 
Tr. 75. In the complaining letter to the Bar, Mrs. Behunin in-
dicated the appellant advised her at this meeting that he was, 
in fact, going to represent Mr. Burr in the criminal matter. 
Ex. 20. At the disciplinary hearing, Mrs. Behunin described the 
Helper meeting in different terms. She testified that appellant 
informed her that he was considering representing Mr. Burr (Tr. 
22), and she described a subsequent telephone conversation 
during which appellant told her he would probably not take _Mr. 
Burr's case. Tr. 27. Mrs. Behunin testified that sometime 
later she heard a rumor that appellant had taken Mr. Burr's 
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criminal case, whereupon the letter of August 25, 1976 was sent 
to the Bar. Tr. 28; Ex. 20. If, as Mrs. Behunin testified, the 
letter was written because she had just heard a rumor that ap-
pell ant had taken Mr. Burr's case, it is incredible that the 
letter indicates he told her this at the earlier meeting in 
Helper. 
Appellant characterized Mrs. Behunin's testimony in this 
regard as a lie. Tr. 77. He related a telephone conversation 
with her concerning his representation of Mr. Burr. Appellant 
had told Mr. Burr that he could not represent him unless Mrs. 
Behunin approved. Tr. 77. He did not think there would be an 
actual conflict since the two cases were totally unrelated, but 
he did not want Mrs. Behunin to feel uneasy; and, under the cir-
cumstances, he sought her consent. Tr. 78, 87. During the 
telephone conversation, Mrs. Behunin asked whether appellant's 
representation of Mr. Burr would help or hurt the company's 
case. Appellant stated that he did not think it would either 
help or hurt because the two cases were unrelated. Tr. 78. 
Appellant understood that Mrs. Behunin gave him her express 
consent. Tr. 79. 
The appellant subsequently conversed with Tex Olsen, Mr. 
Burr's lawyer in the civil case against the corporation, and Kay 
Mc I ff, the prosecutor in the criminal case. Neither expressed 
any objection to the dual representation. They discussed the 
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possibility of continuing trial of the civil case until the 
criminal trial was concluded; and all parties being in agree-
ment, this was done. Tr. 78. In granting the continuance, the 
trial court obviously was aware of appellant's dual representa-
tion and expressed no concern in this regard. Appellant testi-
fied that Mrs. Behunin agreed to the continuance. Tr. 79. Ap-
pellant stated that Mrs. Behunin knew he was representing Mr. 
Burr because when he was in Salina for matters concerning the 
criminal case, he occasionally visited the automobile agency and 
talked with her about the civil case. She knew why he was in 
Salina, and she did not complain about his representation of Mr. 
Burr. Appellant first learned of her dissatisfaction when he 
received a copy of the letter of August 25, 1976, from the Bar. 
Appellant never received any complaints directly from Mrs. 
Behunin or any other representatives of her company. Tr. 83. 
Mrs. Behunin admits that she never actually told the ap-
pellant of her discontent. At the hearing, she claimed she was 
unable to reach him by telephone, but conceded that she left no 
messages at his office to the effect that she was in any way 
dissatisfied. Tr. 30, 31. She did not write appellant a letter 
telling him that she did not want him to represent Mr. Burr. 
Tr. 31. She admits that the first complaint she made was to the 
Bar. Tr. 31. 
The letter dated August 25, 1976, and addressed to the 
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Utah State Bar, was written on letterhead styled "Kay Lou 
Chevrolet-Olds" and was signed "Kay Lou Chevrolet-Oldsmobile" by 
Kay Lou Jenkins (Wheeler)* as president of the corporation. 
Ex. 20. The letter reflects concern that the appellant was 
going to represent Mr. Burr, which she says in the letter she 
learned directly from appellant at the meeting in Helper. The 
letter indicates that Mrs. Behunin had made several phone calls 
to appellant's office and had received no reply. Mrs. Behunin 
stated that she did not know what appellant's intentions were 
toward the case. The letter states: 
"If Mr. Hansen isn't going to prepare my case, maybe 
I should consult another attorney and request Mr. 
Hansen to return my retainer fee. I expect to pay 
Mr. Hansen for any services he has performed, but I 
really can't see that he has done anything to pre-
pare this case." 
The corporation in its letter to the Bar stated a belief 
that there was a conflict of interest, but does not complain 
that the fee charged was excessive. The company did not request 
a refund and there was no complaint in the letter, or for that 
matter at any time, concerning a "nonrefundable fee." Ex. 20; 
Tr. 18. A copy of the letter was sent to appellant by the Bar 
on September 2, 1976. Ex. 1. 
Mrs. Behunin testified that she did not thereafter re-
quest a refund of the fee. She talked to Mr. Sheffield (Execu-
tive Director of the Bar) about the matter and assumed that she 
i Mrs. Behunin was previously known as Mrs. Wheeler and as Mrs. 
Jenkins. 
-9-
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should wait for the Bar to advise her "as to what to do about 
that and obtaining another attorney." Tr. 28. 
Within ten days of September 2, 1976, Mrs. Behunin and 
her husband met with appellant in his office. Tr. 32, 89. Ap-
pell ant asked why she had not complained to him. Tr. 8 9. Ac-
cording to Mrs. Behunin, appellant expressed his understanding 
that she had consented to his representation of Mr. Burr, and 
she stated her understanding that she had not consented. Tr, 
32. Mrs. Behunin then testified as follows: 
"And then I said I thought I should probably get 
another counsel and I also expressed that I might 
like some of my money back. I would be glad to pay 
him for what he had done but I thought I ought to 
obtain other legal assistance." Tr. 33 (emphasis 
added). 
Appellant told Mrs. Behunin to think it over and let him know 
what she wanted to do. Tr. 33, 89. She answered as follows: 
"I said we would still think about it. 
" 
Tr. 33. On this 
note, Mrs. Behunin and her husband left appellant's office. The 
corporate records were left with appellant. Tr. 33. 
For the next twenty days, the appellant heard nothing 
from Mrs. Behunin and reasonably assumed she was still consider-
ing the matter. Since he had not been terminated, he continued 
to function as the corporation's lawyer, and he obtained another 
continuance of the trial date. On September 27, 1976, the Exec-
utive Director of the Bar sent appellant a letter indicating 
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that the Bar had advised Mrs. Behunin that she need not talk to 
appellant. Ex. 7. The civil case was still pending, and appel-
lant was still counsel of record. Appellant still had not been 
advised of any decision to replace him with new counsel and, for 
that reason, he wrote to Mrs. Behunin on October 1, 1976. Tr. 
89; Ex. 5. In part, the letter reads as follows: 
"At the discussion that I had with you and your hus-
band, it was agreed that I was to have your matter 
continued and you were to contact me as to your 
position relative to the continuation of my repre-
senting you. When we were unable to meet, I had 
the matter continued without date by stipulation 
with counsel for Mr. Burr and have continued to 
prepare your defense and counterclaim. 
It has been assumed that I am still your lawyer, 
and the same assumption will continue unless you 
advise me to the contrary within five days from the 
date of this letter. 
* * * 
This office is proceeding with the assumption that 
we are still representing you and that we have no 
disagreement. If you have any thoughts to the con-
trary, please contact me at your convenience to 
otherwise inform me." (Ex. 5). 
Appellant received no answer for five months. On Feb-
ruary 28, 1977, he received a letter from Kay Lou Chevrolet-
Oldsmobile dated February 26, 1977. Ex. 15. The letter refers 
to the conversation in appellant's office during the second week 
in September, 1976. The letter seems to indicate that a refund 
was requested during the meeting but denied. This is contrary 
to Mrs. Behunin's testimony at the hearing, when she denied that 
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a refund was ever discussed. Tr. 18, 28, 33. In any event, the 
letter itself does not request a refund of any part of the fee, 
It does indicate that other counsel had been obtained. Ex. 15. 
Upon receipt of this letter, which was nearly two months 
after the formal Bar proceedings in this matter had commenced, 
appellant was finally advised that he had been discharged. He 
immediately turned the company's files over to its new lawyer, 
Gary Howe. See Response to Request for Production of Documents. 
III. The __ Complaint against appellant and _ _proceejings 
before the Bar Commission. 
By letter dated September 2, 1976, the Utah State Bar 
advised appellant that a complaint had been filed against him 
and enclosed a copy of the letter dated August 25, 1976. Ex. 1. 
The letter from the Bar requested a response to the Disciplinary 
Screening Committee within ten days. On September 26, 1976, ap-
pellant sent a letter to the Executive Director of the Utah 
State Bar requesting an additional ten days within which to res-
pond. Ex. 4. Another letter was sent to appellant on September 
24, 1976, indicating that no response had been received. The 
appellant was advised by the second letter that the Disciplinary 
Screening Committee still desired an answer within ten days. 
Ex. 2. On October 26, 1976, appellant was sent a third letter 
by the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar, stating that he 
had failed to respond and advising him that he could meet with 
-12-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Disciplinary Screening Committee on October 28, 1976. Ex. 
3. Appellant received this letter on October 28, 1976, and his 
secretary called the Bar to advise them that he had a conflict 
and could not meet with the Screening Committee on that date. 
Deposition of Phil L. Hansen, page 10 (March 22, 1977). It is 
noteworthy that during this period of time, appellant had met 
with Mrs. Behunin to clarify and resolve the problem. She did 
not discharge him and, according to her, said she would "think 
about it." Subsequently, the Bar's Executive Director advised 
Mrs. Behunin to cease communicating with her corporation's coun-
sel of record. 
Whether or not appellant was afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to appear before the Screening Committee prior to 
the filing of the formal Complaint, it is clear that any such 
opportunity was limited to the complaints, if any, contained in 
the August 25, 1976 letter to the Bar. Ex. 20. Nothing in the 
corporation's letter to the Bar can be construed as a complaint 
that the fee was excessive or otherwise improper. Appellant was 
not given any notice of such charge, let alone afforded the op-
portunity to appear before the Screening Committee to answer it. 
The formal Complaint was filed on December 29, 1976. It 
alleged that appellant was employed by Kay Lou Jenkins (Wheeler) 
to defend her in a lawsuit brought by Theodore Burr, that appel-
lant was paid the sum of $5, 000 as a fee, and that thereafter 
complainant had difficulty contacting appellant. The Complaint 
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further alleged that during the pendency of the proceedings in 
which appellant had contracted to represent complainant, ap-
pellant undertook the defense of Theodore Burr in criminal 
proceedings without the knowledge or consent of complainant. 
The Complaint charged 
"that by reason of the action of Phil L. Hansen and 
his failure to make himself available to his client 
as aforesaid, the aforesaid Phil L. Hansen had 
violated the Canons of Ethics of the Utah State 
Bar, 
" 
The specific charges against appellant were as follows: 
Rule IV, Canon 4, DR4-101 (placed himself in a 
position to violate the confidence of his client); 
Rule IV, Canon 5, DRS-101 (undertook an employ-
ment interest adverse or in conflict with the in-
terests of his client); 
Rule IV, Canon 6, DR6-101(A)(3) (neglected a 
legal matter entrusted to him); 
Rule IV, Canon 2, DR2-106 (charged a fee that 
was clearly excessive); and 
Rule IV, Canon 1, DR1-102(A)(5) (engaged in ac-
tion prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
No reference was made to the nonrefundable nature of the fee or 
appellant's method of billing. As to the fee, the clear infe~ 
ence is merely that the dollar amount was excessive. 
At the disciplinary hearing, the charges involving 
DR4-101 and DR6-101(A)(3) were dismissed on motion oft~' 
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prosecutor, 
alleged 
Tr. 3. 
and the hearing proceeded on the remaining charges 
violations of DR5-101, DR2-106 and DR1-102(A)(5). 
In response to the Complaint, appellant filed a Motion 
to Remand the matter to the Screening Committee since appellant 
had not been afforded an opportunity to appear and present his 
defenses before the Screening Committee as provided by Rule II, 
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar. Subse-
quently, appellant received a pleading entitled, for no expli-
cable reason, "Notice" and signed by the Executive Director 
stating that the Trial Committee had no authority to remand 
matters to the Screening Committee. It did not state by what 
authority the Executive Director acted. 
At the disciplinary hearing on September 29, 1977, Mrs. 
Behunin and appellant were the only witnesses. In addition to 
their testimony and the exhibits introduced at the disciplinary 
hearing, the transcripts of the depositions of appellant and 
Mrs. Behunin were published, together with the exhibits attached 
to those depositions. Tr. 36. 
In addition to eliciting the testimony previously set 
forth herein, much time was spent questioning appellant concern-
ing speculative and hypothetical matters and his "general philo-
sophical feeling." Most of these questions were asked by the 
three members of the Hearing Committee. See Tr. 98-137. 
-15-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant was questioned concerning his "concept in the normal 
course of charging a flat fee" (Tr. 105); his "philosophical 
belief" concerning the lawyer's role, and whether the reputation 
he brings "into a courtroom would carry some power or some 
weight with it because Phil Hansen is in that courtroom" (Tr. 
113-115); whether he thought there was a refund due (Tr. 117); 
the method by which he charged for his services--not in this 
particular case, but the "principle in general" (Tr. 126); his 
"general philosophical feeling" as to whether a refund should be 
made (Tr. 127); whether appellant contemplated calling Mr. Burr 
as a witness in the criminal case as he "theorized about defend-
ing the case" and, if so, whether he would be vouching for Mr. 
Burr's credibility (Tr. 133, 145); whether Mr. Burr could con-
duct the civil suit if he were incarcerated (Tr. 135); and 
whether the Bar Association has any right to dictate what fees 
appellant should charge (Tr. 136). 
Most of these questions had nothing to do with the 
charges contained in the Complaint. Nevertheless, the appellant 
and the Hearing Commit tee 
how fees should be fixed. 
engaged in lively debate concerning 
Obviously, the Committee disagreed 
with appellant's "philosophical" concept that a lawyer's fee 
should be governed by the marketplace. Significantly, however, 
the appellant's client did not complain about the amount of the 
fee--either in the letter of August 25, 1976, (Ex. 20) or in the 
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testimony of Mrs. Behunin, the company's president. The issue 
of the so-called "nonrefundable fee" first arose during appel-
lant' s testimony and in the debate which ensued between appel-
lant and the Comrni ttee members. One looks in vain for any 
charge in the Complaint concerning nonrefundabili ty of fees or 
retainers. Appellant was cited for charging a fee which was 
"clearly excessive," and there is no evidence that the corpora-
tion ever claimed the amount to be excessive. He received no 
notice prior to the hearing that refundability of the fee or his 
general "philosophy" as to fees would be in issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POitlT I 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
Appellant was denied his right to due process of law in 
the proceedings before the Screening Committee, the Hearing Corn-
mittee, and the Board of Commissioners. In addition, the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions filed by the Hearing Committee and 
approved by the Board of Commissioners are not supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. Finally, the Disciplinary Recom-
mendation of the Hearing Committee, which was adopted by the 
Board of Commissioners, is unreasonable and excessive. For each 
of these reasons, appellant urges the Court to reject the 
Board's Recommendation. 
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A. Appellant was not given proper notice of the charges 
~ which the Recommendation is based, and for that reason did 
not have a p~er opportunity ~~~e_n_Q__hjmse_l_r.. 
The Order Recommending Suspension violates Article I, 
Section 7, of the Constitution of the State of Utah, Utah Code 
Ann.§§ 78-51-12, 78-51-16, 78-51-17, and 78-51-18 (Repl. 1953), 
the Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar, and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
because appellant was not given proper notice of what became the 
charge against him. 
1. The violation of DR5-105. 
In the formal Complaint, appellant was charged with via-
la ting DR5-101 of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of 
the Utah State Bar. DR5-101(A) states as follows: 
"Except with the consent of his client after 
full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employ-
ment if the exercise of his professional judgment 
on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may 
be affected by his own financial, business, prop-
erty, or personal interests." (Emphasis added). 
DR5-101 (B) provides that a lawyer shall not accept employment in 
contemplated or pending litigation if he knows, or it is ob-
vious, that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a 
witness except under certain circumstances. 
Following the disciplinary hearing, the Hearing Commit-
tee concluded that appellant had violated DR5-105, 
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"in that the undertaking by respondent of the rep-
resentation of Ted Burr prevented the respondent 
from exercising independent professional judgment 
in behalf of his client, Mrs. Behunin, or was 
likely to so impair his professional judgment." 
In making this finding, the Hearing Committee paraphrased 
DR5-105 (A), which reads as follows: 
"A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if 
the exercise of his independent professional judg-
ment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to 
be adversely affected by the acceptance of the 
proffered employment, or if it would be likely to 
involve him in representing differing interests. 
" 
Need less to say, DR5-101 and DR5-105 are concerned with differ-
ent situations. DR5-101 is concerned with circumstances under 
which the personal interests of the lawyer may impair his inde-
pendent professional judgment. DR5-105, on the other hand, is 
concerned with a situation where the interests of another 
_c:l:_ient may impair the independent professional judgment of the 
lawyer. 
Appellant was never charged with violating DR5-105. He 
was never given notice of the charge with which he was ulti-
mately "convicted." The Complaint in this matter, which charged 
a violation of DR5-101, was never amended. At the outset of the 
hearing, the prosecutor and the chairman of the Hearing Cammi t-
tee agreed that appellant was charged with DR5-101 and DR2-106. 
Tr. 3. No mention of DR5-105, or the conduct it prohibits, was 
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""""' 
made until after the hearing was over and the tribunal rendered 
its decision. 
Not only was appellant never charged with a violation of 
DR5-105, but he was never afforded an opportunity to appear 
before the Screening Committee on that charge pursuant to Rule 
II, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utar. 
State Bar. Appellant had no opportunity to present defenses to 
such a charge since he had no notice that DR5-105 was even in 
issue. The Bar's conduct in this regard violated the plain 
terms of Utah Code Ann. § 78-51-16 (Repl. 1953), which provides 
that "[a]ny member of the Utah State bar complained of shall 
have notice of the charges against him and opportunity tc 
defend ...• " 
Moreover, appellant was deprived of his constitutional 
right to due process by reason of the Bar's failure to give 
notice of the charges against him. The disciplinary rules pro-
mulgated by the Utah State Bar and approved by this Court pro-
vi de 
"The complaint shall set forth in clear and concise 
language the facts upon which the charge of profes-
sional misconduct is based and the particular 
provision of the Code of Ethics with which the 
attorney is accused of violating." Rule II, 
Revised Rules of Discipline of the Utah State Bar. 
In failing to comply with this provision, the Bar violated it 5 
own rules as well as appellant's fundamental rights. 
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Courts in virtually every jurisdiction considering the 
question have held that a lawyer cannot constitutionally be 
disbarred or suspended from practice without clear notice of the 
ethical violations with which he is charged. In United States 
y_._Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the United States Supreme Court 
held: "[T]he right to hold specific private employment and to 
follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable government in-
terference comes within the 'liberty' and 'property' concepts of 
the Fifth Amendment." 389 U.S. 265 & n. 11 (quoting from Greene 
~·_!l_cE:l,_!:oy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959)). In Burkett v. Chandler, 
505 F.2d 217, 222 (10th Cir. 1974), the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the Constitution re-
quires notice of hearing "as a prerequisite to the validity of 
disbarment proceedings." In that case, the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that judgments of disbarment were procedurally deficient 
for lack of notice and, therefore, invalid. 
In another Supreme Court case, In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 
544 ( 1968), the petitioner was disbarred from the practice of 
law in proceedings before the state bar commission and, subse-
quently, the Ohio Supreme Court. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ordered petitioner to show cause 
why he should not be disbarred from federal practice, and ulti-
mately determined that he should be disbarred from practice in 
the applicable federal court on the basis of the proceedings 
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before petitioner's state bar commission and the Ohio Sup rem; 
Court. Petitioner then sought Supreme Court review of the Court' 
of Appeals' order of disbarment. 
In the course of its review, the United Stated Supreme: 
Court examined the proceedings leading up to petitioner's state 
disbarment. In those proceedings, petitioner was served with 0 
written complaint setting forth twelve charges. After three 
days of hearings before the bar commission, and on the basis orl 
testimony adduced at those hearings, petitioner was charged wrn 
I 
a thirteenth offense. Although petitioner was permitted to r~; 
spond to the last charge, no further evidence was taken, and the 
Ohio Supreme Court based its order of disbarment solely on the 
thirteenth charge. The Supreme Court reversed. With particular! 
importance to the case before this Court, the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
"Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a 
punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. Ex 
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366; 
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515, 87 S.Ct. 625, 
628, 17 L. Ed. 2d 574. He is accordingly entitled to 
procedural due process, which includes fair notice 
of the charge. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 
273, 68 s.ct. 499, 507, 92 L.Ed. 682. It was said 
in Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540, 19 L.Ed. 
285, that when proceedings for disbarment are 'not 
taken for matters occurring in open court, in the 
presence of the judges, notice should be given to· 
the attorney of the charges made and opportunity 
afforded him for explanation and defence [sic].' 
Therefore, one of the conditions this Court consid-
ers in determining whether disbarment by a State 
should be followed by disbarment here is whether 
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'the state procedure from want of notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard was wanting in due process.' 
Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51, 37 S.Ct. 377 
379, 61 L.Ed. 585. ' 
"In the present case petitioner had no notice that 
his [conduct supporting the thirteenth charge] 
would be considered a disbarment offense until 
after both he and [his witness] had testified at 
length on all the material facts pertaining to this 
phase of the case. As Judge Edwards, dissenting 
below, said, 'Such procedural violation of due pro-
cess would never pass muster in any normal civil or 
criminal litigation.' 370 F.2d, at 462. 
"These are adversary proceedings of a quasicriminal 
nature. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 87 S.Ct. 
1428, 1446, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. The charge must be 
known before the proceedings commence. They become 
a trap when, after they are underway, the charges 
are amended on the basis of testimony of the 
accused. He can then be given no opportunity to 
expunge the earlier statements and start afresh. 
"How the charge would have been met had it been 
originally included in those leveled against 
petitioner by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline no one knows. 
"This absence of fair notice as to the reach of the 
grievance procedure and the precise nature of the 
charge-s deprived petitioner of procedural due~ 
cess." 390 U.S. at 550-52\emphasis added). 
In the present case, as in Ruffalo, the state bar com-
mission recommended a penalty solely on the basis of charges 
never contained in any formal complaint served upon appellant. 
The U. S. Supreme Court's view that such failure of 
notice voids the proceedings, and any conviction based thereon, 
was anticipated by the Utah Supreme Court a half a century 
earlier. In re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 P. 217, (1913). In the 
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Evans case, the Utah Supreme Court held that any failur' 
strictly to comply with prescribed procedures in disbarment pre. 
ceedings, particularly notice requirements, voids the proceed. 
ings. There, attorneys were charged with champerty in disbar. 
ment proceedings before the Supreme Court, but exonerated by t:., 
Court's referee. The Court, while sustaining the referee': 
findings, disbarred the attorneys for failing properly to ac-
count to their clients. Upon further review, the Court foun: 
that this charge was not within the original complaint, and tha· 
no jurisdiction existed to base a conviction upon it. 4 2 Uta· 
at 308-311. The Court stated: 
"That such adjudication, on the face of the record, 
is wholly unsupported by the information or accusa-
tion and clearly without the issues, and hence the 
judgment founded upon it a nullity and subject to 
attack whenever and wherever brought in question, 
cannot be gainsaid." 42 Utah at 311. 
The disbarment was declared void. 
The same strict rule was applied in _In re Oliver, 97 Uta·: 
1, 89 P. 2d 229, ( 1939), in which petitioner filed for reinstate·' 
ment but was given no notice of proceedings before the Ba: 
Association and no opportunity to appear and present evidenc! 
with respect to his petition. The Utah Supreme Court in revie• 
enumerated the procedural deficiencies, voided the Bar's refusa: 
to reinstate, and reiterated the rule that strict complianc' 
with prescribed procedures is required in disbarmer,: 
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proceedings. 89 P. 2d at 234. The rule as to notice was suc-
cinctly stated by the Utah Supreme Court in tJiggins v. Burton, 
64 Utah 562, 232 P. 914 (1924), and Foster v. Burton_, 64 Utah 
550, 232 P. 917 (1924), companion cases regarding a disbarment 
proceeding in a District Court conducted without notice of the 
charges to the accused attorneys: "The right to be heard before 
one is condemned is, however, so fundamental that authority is 
unnecessary." 232 P. at 916. 
The decisions of other courts require the same result. 
For example, in Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances 
v. Johnson, 447 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1971), a lawyer appealed the 
order of a district court suspending him from law practice for 
twelve months. The basis of the lawyer's suspension was a com-
plaint by the Virgin Islands bar disciplinary committee alleging 
that the lawyer had acted unethically by failing to disclose to 
prospective purchasers of property certain material facts about 
the property. Toward the close of the hearing before the dis-
ciplinary committee, the attorney was advised for the first time 
that he was also charged with allegedly violating duties running 
to the seller of the property. The lawyer's suspension from 
practice was predicated solely on the latter charge. The Court 
of Appeals reversed the lawyer's suspension on the ground that 
his rights to procedural due process were violated in the hear-
ings before the disciplinary committee and, thus, in the lower 
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court. 
"We need not speculate as to how respondent would 
have altered the presentation of his case if he had 
been originally charged with this breach. It is 
enough to observe that the proceedings became a 
trap when the first warning of the charges came 
towards the end of the trial, at the conclusion of 
the testimony of respondent and his primary witness 
p~~_r:_~c-~_c on tern p 1 a _t~_~_Q_ o_t ice w hi c_l1_ 
gives a party adequate opport~i t_y__!:_S> _ _prepa_!'_e his 
case. In these circumstances, respondent was en-
titled to know the exact charges againsf---hirn before 
th-e commencement~ pro_c_ee?_1ngs. ,,----Icr:--at-173 
(emphasis added!.""" 
In People v. Denious, 118 Colo. 342, 196 P. 2d 257 
(1948), the Colorado State Bar Association filed a written com-
plaint against an attorney containing four specific charges of 
misconduct. In proceedings before a referee appointed by the 
Colorado Supreme Court, the bar association sought to introduce 
evidence of other alleged violations. The referee refused the 
bar's tender and concluded that the attorney had not been guilty 
of any misconduct. The Colorado Supreme Court adopted the deci-
sion of the referee and, in so doing, held that the lawyer coul: 
not be sanctioned on the basis of charges of which he was not 
notified in writing. "The right to be informed in advance cf 
accusations to be made is fundamental in our Anglo-Saxon law." 
196 P.2d at 265. The court concluded that the referee "coul: 
properly hear and determine only the specific charges containe: 
in the petition before him." Id. at 266. See also, In r~· 
supra, 42 Utah at 302-03. 
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In State v. Berk~, 520 P.2d 1255 (Kan. 1974), two at-
torneys were charged by the Kansas Board of Law Examiners with 
unethical solicitation of and advertising for legal business. 
At the close of a hearing, the Board held that the attorneys had 
violated certain provisions of Kansas' Code of Professional Res-
ponsibility, but not the sections which dealt with either soli-
citation or advertising. The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the 
Board's recornmenda tions on the basis of a rule substantially 
identical to the provisions of Rule III .1, Revised Rules of 
Discipline of the Utah State Bar, stating: 
"Under the circumstances the acts with which the 
respondents were found guilty were never the basis 
of a charge concerning which they were notified, 
and they were found not guilty of the charges 
concerning which they were notified." J_i. at 1257. 
Precisely the same can be said of appellant and the pro-
ceedings before the Utah State Bar Commission in this case. The 
Hearing Committee ultimately recommended sanctions against ap-
pellant on the basis of charges of which he never had notice. 
Appellant came to the disciplinary hearing prepared to defend 
himself against the charge of violating DR5-101 as set forth in 
the formal Complaint. Apparently, after hearing all of the evi-
dence, the Hearing Committee decided not that his judgment_ was 
affected by his personal interests, as charged, but that he was 
"guilty" of something else. The Committee made no finding what-
soever insofar as DR5-101 is concerned. It must have concluded 
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that appellant violated DR5-105, since it found he had accepted 
employment (profferred by tlr. Burr) which was likely to impair 
his professional judgment (in the re pre sen ta ti on of Mrs. Behu-
nin's company). This conclusion, upon which the Order Recorn-
mending Suspension by the Board of Commissioners of the Utah 
State Bar is based, cannot stand. 
The Hearing Committee in its Conclusion No. 2 found that 
the appellant 
"continued in the employ of both Mr. Burr and Mrs. 
Behunin, even though his independent professional 
judgment was or was likely to have been adversely 
affected or impaired, notwithstanding Mrs. Behunin 
advising the [appellant] that she did not want the 
[appellant] to represent Mr. Burr while the [appel-
lant] was representing her." 
Obviously, this conclusion is a corollary of Conclusion No. I 
and is also based on an assumed violation of DR5-105. As such, 
it suffers the same constitutional and statutory defects as Co~ 
clusion No. 1. 
Moreover, the evidence, if any, is hardly clear and con-
vincing as to Conclusion No. 2. The corporation's letter to the 
Bar dated August 25, 1976, (Ex. 20) does not support Conclusion 
No. 2. Similarly, Mrs. Behunin's testimony at the hearing fails 
to support that conclusion. The record is clear that after 
meeting with appellant in September of 1976, Mrs. Behunin was 
going to "think about it" and advise appellant whether or not 
she wanted other counsel. Tr. 33. At the hearing, Mrs. Behuni~ 
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admitted that she never actually told appellant she was dis-
satisfied in any regard. She wrote no letters, she left no mes-
sages, and she did not advise the appellant that she did not 
want him representing both Mr. Burr and her company until after 
the disciplinary proceedings had commenced. Tr. 30, 31. During 
the hearing, Mrs. Behunin admitted that her first complaint to 
anyone was the letter that she sent to the Bar. Tr. 31. After 
she contacted the Bar, its Executive Director told her not to 
talk to appellant. Ex. 7. Faced with the obvious dilemma of 
being the subject of a bar complaint filed by a client, and 
still being counsel of record for that client in an ongoing 
case, appellant wrote to Mrs. Behunin on October 1, 1976 ad-
vising her that unless he was told otherwise, he could only as-
sume that he was still her company's lawyer. Tr. 89; Ex. 5. 
Indeed, as counsel of record, it would be of questionable ethics 
to cease functioning as counsel without knowing the client's 
wishes and the Bar's interference prevented the very communica-
tion between Mrs. Behunin and the appellant which was necessary 
to clarify the matter. Finally, by letter dated February 26, 
1977, almost two months following the filing of the formal Com-
plaint, appellant was advised by the corporation that other 
counsel had been obtained. Ex. 15. 
The formal Complaint, which had been filed by the Bar 
some two months earlier, contains no allegation that Mrs. 
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Behunin advised the appellant that she did not want him to rep. 
resent Mr. Burr while he was representing her company. Appel- / 
I 
lant was never charged with a violation of DR5-105, nor was he I 
1. 
given notice of any charge involving the prohibitions of that 
I 
section. 
2. The violation of DR2-106. 
The formal Complaint filed against appellant alleged a 
violation of DR2-106, "in that he has charged a fee that is 
clearly excessive." This was the only notice which appellant 
received prior to the formal hearing of any charge that the fee 
in question was excessive or, for that matter, improper for any 
other reason. The corporation's letter to the Bar dated August 
25, 1976, did not complain about the fee. Ex. 20. Indeed, the 
record does not indicate that Mrs. Behunin or the corporation 
ever complained about the fee. Mrs. Behunin testified that she 
did not request a refund from appellant. Rather, she talked to 
the Executive Director of the Bar about it and assumed that she 
should wait for the Bar to advise her. Tr. 28. At the meeting 
with appellant in September, Mrs. Behunin recalled that she "e~ 
pressed that I might like some of my money back." Tr. 33· 
There is no evidence that Mrs. Behunin ever complained that the 
agreed upon fee was excessive. 
Appellant was not afforded his right to a hearing befo~ 
the Screening Committee as to this charge prior to the time the 
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Complaint was filed. Rule II of the Revised Rules of Discipline 
of the Utah State Bar provides in paragraph 6 as follows: 
"The Screening Committee shall afford to the accused 
attorney an opportunity to appear and present any 
defenses which he may have to the charges before 
the Committee shall recommend censure, or before 
the filing of a formal complaint." 
Insofar as the charge under DR2-106 is concerned, the Bar did 
not comply with this rule. 
Even though the Screening Committee did afford the ap-
pellant an opportunity to appear before it, it clearly did not 
do so after giving notice of any charge against him regarding 
his fee in this matter. Appellant could hardly appear before 
the Screening Committee and present defenses to a claim that his 
fee was excessive if he never was advised that he was charged 
with that violation until after the Screening Committee had met. 
The Hearing Committee concluded, in Conclusion No. 3, 
that the conduct of the appellant violated DR2-106 since, among 
other things, 
"it created a conflict of interest between the re-
spondent and his client. • • • It would be against 
the financial interests of the respondent to incur 
any out-of-pocket expenses in preparation of the 
case, • 
" 
The Bar ought to refrain from such patent speculation. 
There is no evidence that appellant ever avoided or minimized 
expenses in order to increase his fees. Indeed, the evidence 
establishes unequivocally that appellant incurred out-of-pocket 
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expenses that were substantial in proportion to the total amount 
of the fee charged. The Bar seems to say the fee was improper 
because the possibility of abuse by the attorney existed. Yet, 
such a possibility exists in every fee arrangement. If expenses 
are not included in the fee, an attorney may engage in needles: 
discovery to obtain a free vacation to a warm climate in the 
wintertime. The mechanistic timekeeping and billing-by-the-hour 
system embraced by the Hearing Committee has perhaps the 
greatest potential for abuse in that an attorney could easily I 
log hours in his time book which, in fact, he did not work. The 
"conflict of interest" referred to in Conclusion No. 3 exists in 
every fee arrangement because it would always be in the attor· 
ney's "interest" to prepare a case in a manner that would max~ 
mize his fee, regardless of the type of fee arrangement chosen. 
We do not censure attorneys for what may, but did not, happen. ! 
I 
Not only is Conclusion No. 3 speculative, and not only I 
is there no evidence to support it, but there is absolutel) I 
nothing in the text of DR2-106 which would even suggest that I 
such a conflict would make any particular fee "excessive anc I 
improper." The appellant did not receive notice of any charge 
concerning his fee prior to the filing of the formal Complaint, 
and the Complaint itself does not disclose this so-called con· 
flict of interest as a matter with which appellant is charged. 
The Hearing Committee's Conclusion No. 3 also state;! 
' 
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that the fee was excessive, 
"since by virtue of being non-refundable the client 
could not terminate the attorney-client relation-
ship without suffering an economic hardship." 
Once again, the Committee's conclusion is in no way en-
compassed by the text of DR2-106, nor did the Complaint in any 
way factually allege that the nonrefundable nature of the fee 
was any part of the charge against appellant. Appellant was 
simply never given any notice that this was something with which 
he was charged. The corporation's letter complaining to the Bar 
was not concerned with the amount of the fee and said nothing 
concerning its refundable or nonrefundable nature. Ex. 20. The 
issue of whether or not the fee was refundable arose in connec-
tion with the appellant's testimony during the hearing and be-
came important only in the context of the debate which subse-
quently developed between the appellant, the prosecutor, and the 
Hearing Committee members. There is no language in the formal 
Complaint concerning nonrefundability. Appellant was cited for 
charging a fee which was "clearly excessive." He received no 
notice of any charge concerning whether or not the fee was re-
fundable, and he was not afforded the opportunity to appear 
before the Screening Committee or the Hearing Committee insofar 
as that charge was concerned. 
The same authorities cited above in connection with ap-
pellant's alleged violation of DRS-105 also require the 
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conclusion that appellant's statutory and constitutional rights 
were violated in connection with the alleged violation of 
DR2-106. 
B. The Board of Commissioners did not base its order on 
proper evidence. 
In making its recommendation to this Court, the Board of 
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar misrepresents that it 
considered the evidence. The Order Recommending Suspension re-
cites that the evidence adduced at the hearing was considered; 
however, the Board of Commissioners did not review or examine 
exhibits or engage in any activity known to appellate tribunals 
as consideration of the evidence. The most that can be said is 
that the full Bar Commission met and listened to the three co~ 
missioners who constituted the Hearing Committee. The Bar Com-
mission then reviewed the Findings of Fact and Recommendations 
made by the Hearing Committee and, apparently with one change, 
approved them. In effect, the appellate tribunal 
trial judges what the evidence was, and then adopted 
the evidentiary findings of the lower court without 
pendent examination of a single piece of evidence. 
hardly "consideration" of the evidence. 
asked the I 
as its own 
. ct I 
any in e-1 
Such is 
The Board purported to act in compliance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-51-18 (Repl. 1953), which requires it to make findings 
and reports to the Supreme Court of the results of its hearings 
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and investigations and conclusions with recommendations, and 
"in all cases in which the evidence in the opinion 
of a ~ajority of the Board justifies such a course, 
shall recommend such disciplinary action by public 
or private reprimand, suspension from the practice 
of law, or exclusion and disbarment therefrom, as 
the case shall in its judgment warrant." (Emphasis 
added). 
The plain fact is that the Board charged with making findings, 
conclusions and reco1:1mendations based on the evidence did not 
even look at the evidence. This Court, in Evans, supra, held 
that violations of evidentiary procedures in disbarment matters 
will void any findings based thereon: "Facts so found and 
findings so made without the issues, and found and made by 
methods at variance with the forms and practice of the court, 
and unauthorized by law, cannot support a judgment." 42 Utah at 
314. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS FILED BY THE 
HEARING COMMITTEE AND APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF COM-
MISSIONERS OF THE UTAH STATE BAR ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY PROPER EVIDENCE. 
Disbarment proceedings place in issue important profes-
sional interests of the accused, and for that reason, the stand-
ard of proof imposed upon the prosecution is substantially more 
stringent than the standard applied in ordinary civil proceed-
ings. Much more than a preponderance of the evidence is re-
quired. The prosecutor must prove the charge to "a reasonable 
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certainty," by "clear and convincing evidence." 
~~~~llo~_gQ, 97 Utah 533, 95 P.2d 13 (1939); In_~~-~~~f~~lane, 10 
Utah 2d 217, 350 P.2d 631 (1960). The reason for the clear and 
convincing evidence standard is succinctly stated in the case of 
!J:!_~~_Hanson, 48 Utah 163, 167, 158 Pac. 778, 779 (1916) and by 
Justice Wade in the Ma~farl~ne case: 
"To disbar an attorney is a very serious matter 
indeed. It not only may deprive him of gaining a 
livelihood for hi:nself and a dependent f::i.mily, but 
it may, and usually does, result in preventing him 
from making available all antecedent preparation, 
although that may cover practically the period of a 
lifetime. In no other calling are such far-reach-
ing consequences visited upon a delinquent who has 
not been found guilty of some felonious act. The 
rule, therefore, that the evidence should be clear 
and convincing is based upon a most solid founda-
tion.. " In r~!1~Cf§rl~QS:, 350 P.2d at 636 
(dissenting opinion!. 
Because of the harsh conse'luences of this type of dis-
ciplinary proceeding, disputes in the evidence should be re-
solved in favor of the attorney. 
"In disciplinary proceedings this court examines and 
weighs the evidence and passes upon its suffi-
ciency. Any reasonable doubts encountered in 
the making of such an examination should be re-
solved in favor of the accused. (Black v. State 
Bar, supra, 57 Cal.2d 219, 222, 18 Cal.Rptr. 518, 
368 P.2d 118; Brawner v. State Bar, 48 Cal.2d 814, 
818, 313 P.2d 1; Browne v. State Bar, 45 Cal.2d 
165, 168, 169, 287 P.2d 745; Hildebrand v. State 
Bar, 18 Cal.2d 816, 834, 117 P.2d 860; see also 
Zitney v. State Bar, 64 A.C. 852, 855, 51 Cal.Rptr. 
825, 415 P.2d 521, and In re Bar Association of San 
Francisco v. Sullivan, 185 Cal. 621, 623-624, 198 
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p • 7 •)II 
The Hearing Committee's essential Findings of Fact were 
not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, many of 
the Findings have no support in the evidence at all. 
Finding No. 4 states that Ted Burr sued Mrs. Behunin. 
This is simply not true. Ted Burr filed a civil action against 
"Kay Lou Chevrolet Company, a corporation." Ex. 24. Finding 
No. 4 also incorrectly states: "That prior to that time Mrs. 
Behunin had never been involved in civil litigation other than 
divorce proceedings." Mrs. Behunin was not involved in this 
civil action. A corporation in the business of selling automo-
biles was the defendant. Finding No. 4 seems to infer that Mrs. 
Behunin was some naive individual, unsophisticated and ill-
equipped to strike a fair bargain with a lawyer. To the con-
trary, the record indicates that Mrs. Behunin was the president, 
the sole stockholder, and the principal executive of a corpora-
tion engaged in the daily business of selling automobiles. The 
inference properly to be drawn is that she was a rather sophis-
ticated business person who ought to have known whether or not 
she was getting a good bargain. In any event, the finding is 
erroneous, as is Finding No. 5, which states that Mrs. Behunin 
was served with summons and complaint. 
poration was served. 
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Finding No. 6 is concerned with the payment of the 
$5,000 fee and implies that Mrs. Behunin paid the fee. She did 
not; the fee was paid by the corporation. Ex. 22. That finding 
is further erroneous because it states: "[T]he money would be 
retained regardless of whether or not the case went to trial." 
The only evidence from Mrs. Behunin in the record indicates that 
what was actually said was that the fee was $5,000, "whether we 
settled out of court, whether we went to court." Tr. 16. Find-
ing No. 13 states that the respondent represented Mrs. Behunin 
in the civil action. Again, he did not; he represented the 
corporation. Finding No. 14 states that the $5,000 was paid by 
Mrs. Behunin. It was not. The corporation paid the $5,000 fee. 
Ex. 22. 
Finding No. 16 states that after the appellant advised 
Mrs. Behunin that he was representing, or intending to represent 
Mr. Burr, Mrs. Behunin advised him that this was contrary to her 
wishes. The evidence does not support this finding. See Point 
I of this Brief. 
Finding No. 17 again states that the civil action was 
filed against Mrs. Behunin. No civil action was ever filed 
against Mrs. Behunin, and the finding is completely erroneous. 
Finding No. 18 indicates that Mrs. Behunin filed a writ-
ten complaint with the Utah State Bar. She did not; the corpo-
ration filed the complaint. The complaint was written on the 
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corporation letterhead, and it was signed, "Kay Lou Chevrolet-
Oldsmobile, by Kay Lou Jenkins (Wheeler), President." Ex. 20. 
Finding No. 19 refers to the meeting in appellant's of-
fice with Mrs. Behunin and her husband. It states that Mrs. 
Behunin requested the return of a portion of appellant's fee and 
said she would retain other counsel. The evidence in the record 
is contrary. Mrs. Behunin testified that she left that meeting 
with the idea that she would think it over and decide whether or 
not she wanted appellant for her lawyer. Tr. 33. She did not 
contact appellant again until her letter dated February 26, 
1977. Ex. 15. It is true that this letter seems to indicate 
that a refund was requested during the meeting in question; how-
ever, this is contrary to Mrs. Behunin's testimony at the hear-
ing, where she denied that a refund was ever discussed. See Tr. 
18, 28, 33. 
Findin3 No. 20 concerns the letter of February 26, 1977. 
The finding states: 
''Mrs. Behunin again wrote to the respondent and 
advised him that new counsel had been obtained and 
requested a refund of the fee, but that the respon-
dent again refused to make a refund of any portion 
of the fee." 
The letter in question does not request a refund of the fee. 
Ex. 15. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in the record 
that the respondent thereafter refused to make a refund of any 
portion of the fee. The finding is erroneous. 
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The Conclusions of the Hearing Committee are erroneous 
as well, in part because they also assume that appellant was re-
presenting Mrs. Behunin in the civil action. On this basis, if 
for no other reason, Conclusions No. and 2 are factually 
erroneous. 
Conclusion 3(a) states that the fee was 
"clearly excessive and improper in that the fixing 
of said fee by the respondent did not take into 
consideration all relevant circumstances, including 
the time required, the nature of the case, the re-
sponsibility involved and the results obtained." 
There is no evidence to support this Conclusion, and it 
completely ignores the testimony of the appellant which was the 
only evidence presented on this point. The appellant testified 
that in fixing the fee he analyzed the case, its complexity a~ 
the location of the court in which it was pending. Tr. 57, 59; 
Ex. 24, 20. He considered the work which would be required and 
the time required for that work. Tr. 55. Appellant considered 
his experience, reputation and ability; he estimated the time 
and expense of preparation and the time which would be required 
for trial. Tr. 60, 62, 69, 115. 
The record is clear that appellant considered most of 
the factors enumerated in DR2-106(B) of the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar. There is nothing in 
the record to the contrary other than the argument of the 
prosecutor and the members of the Hearing Committee. Absolutely 
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no evidence was presented as to what a reasonable fee would be 
under the circumstances. No lawyers were called to testify con-
cerning that matter. There is nothing in the record against 
which to measure the fee fixed by the appellant and the reasons 
he gave in justifying the amount. Disregard of the only evi-
dence offerred in point and the total absence of contradictory 
evidence hardly constitutes clear and convincing support for the 
Committee's Conclusion No. 3(a). 
Neither the Hearing Committee nor the Board of Commis-
sioners can take it upon itself to decide what a reasonable fee 
would be under the circumstances without any evidence. Indeed, 
a court cannot make such a determination without evidence, and 
courts would seem as competent in this regard as Bar Commis-
sioners. In this connection, Rule III.6 of the Bar's Revised 
Rules of Discipline provides that hearings before the Board or 
its designees "shall be conducted in 
and law of evidence and procedure 
in the District Courts of the 
of argue 
accordance with the rules 
applicable to conduct of 
State of Utah." As a 
that a fee of $5,000 to 
trials 
matter 
defend an 
fact, one can easily 
automobile dealership in a civil action pending in 
Sevier County involving breach of contract and an accounting is 
unreasonably low. This is especially true if the fee is a flat 
fee, meant to include all costs and expenses, including the 
costs of travel and discovery. Although the appellant could be 
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criticized for charging an unreasonably low fee, it is difficult 
to imagine how the Bar or anyone else could criticize him for 
charging an excessive fee. Perhaps this is why there is nothing 
in the record to indicate that his client accused him of that. 
The general rule is that the amount of a lawyer's fee is 
not a matter for disciplinary action unless the fee is so exo~ 
bitant and wholly disproportionate to the services performed as 
to shock the conscience of those to whose attention it is 
called. Se~ I~-~~_Ri~har~~. 202 Or. 262, 274 P.2d 797 (1954). 
In the case of ~~-!::_~_!'{:!:_ltse, 109 Wash. 261, 186 P. 848 
(1920), the court held a claim of an excessive fee to be without 
merit and in so doing stated: 
"we do not feel like depriving a practitioner 
of his right to continue his profession on a 
question as debatable as the propriety of the 
amount of a fee. Such a question is so much a 
matter of individual opinion that it should not be 
the basis of disbarment, except in the most 
aggravated and extreme cases." 
Conclusion No. 3(c) states that since appellant's fee 
was nonrefundable, the client could not terminate the attorney-
client relationship without suffering an economic hardship. 
glaring QQ!!_~~~~it~~ follows: 
"In effect, the lawyer was no longer accountable to 
his client for the quality of his services or the 
propriety of his actions.·• 
It is interesting that the only conflict of testimony 
which was resolved in favor of the lawyer in this matter was his 
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claim that the fee was not refundable. Mrs. Behunin disputed 
this; and, if the Hearing Committee had agreed with her, there 
would be no issue as to the propriety of that type of fee 
arrangement. More importantly, the fact that the fee may have 
been nonrefundable does not mean that the lawyer was no longer 
accountable to his client for the quality of his services or the 
propriety of his actions. Once again, the Committee indulges in 
pure speculation. No evidence was offerred to demonstrate that 
the appellant ceased to deem himself, or cease to be, account-
able to his client. 
The Findings of Fact and the Conclusions of the Commit-
tee which were adopted by the Board are, by and large, errone-
ous. They are not supported by evidence in the record. There-
fore, the Recommendation based upon the Findings and Conclusions 
is equally erroneous. 
POINI__U_l 
THE REC'.JMME:-J::lATIO"l OF THE HEARING COMMITTEE WHICH 
WAS ADOPTED BY THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS IS UN-
REASONABLE AND EXCESSIVE. 
Aside from the unlawful manner in which appellant was 
charged and the denial of due process, and aside from the fact 
that most of the Findings and Conclusions are erroneous and not 
supported by proper evidence, the Recommendation of the Bar. is 
simply unreasonable and excessive in light of the facts of this 
case. 
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This matter does not involve dishonesty. At the most, 
it involves a misunderstanding between appellant and his client 
concerning whether or not he was free to represent Mr. Burr, and 
whether or not he should refund some portion of the fee. In-
deed, if the appellant and his client had a contract whereby for 
a set sum of money he would represent the company through trial, 
the dispute is whether appellant remained fully able to provide 
the contracted for service after he began representing Mr. Burr. 
If a court were to conclude that Mrs. Behunin consented to the 
appellant's representation of Mr. Burr, as the appellant testi-
fied she did, it is submitted that a court should find he re-
mained able to provide the contracted for services and, there-
fore, was entitled to the entire contract price of $5,000, re-
gardless of the dispute as to whether it was a nonrefundable 
retainer. 
There is no claim or even a suggestion that the client 
was hurt in any way. There is no evidence that any confidence 
was ever betrayed. There is no evidence that the civil case was 
lost or that the company's defense was in any way impaired by 
what happened. When Mrs. Behunin obtained other counsel and 
thereby actually asked the appellant to withdraw as counsel, he 
promptly did so. 
The record contains no evidence that at least part of 
the fee was not earned. The issue concerning itS 
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nonrefundability arose in the midst of the hearing itself. 
There is no evidence that the appellant would not refund a 
reasonable portion of the fee to his client. Appellant, in 
fact, testified that he would do that very thing, although he 
argued that he was not legally bound to do so. A review of the 
transcript indicates heated disagreement between appellant and 
the Hearing Committee concerning appellant's methodology as to 
how fees should be set. The Hearing Committee was not so much 
concerned with the case at hand as it was with appellant's 
disagreement with the timekeeping and billing practice preferred 
by the Committee. 
Absent the procedural infirmities, this case can be re-
duced to rather simple terms. At most, the appellant accepted a 
fee in the nature of a nonrefundable retainer which was to be a 
flat sum from which all expenses, including his fee, were to be 
paid through trial of a civil matter. Subsequently, he thought 
he had the consent of Mrs. Behunin to represent Mr. Burr in 
another matter,* but later learned that Mrs. Behunin did not 
believe she had consented to that representation. Appellant 
then met with her to clarify the matter and she said she would 
* Appellant also obtained the consent of Mr. Burr's attorney in 
the civil action, Tex Olsen, and the prosecutor in the criminal 
action, K. L. Mciff. It is most unlikely that he would do this 
if he did not believe he had Mrs. Behunin' s consent. 
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"think about it." The Bar interceded and told her to cease corn-
municating with her company's counsel of record, and the Bar now 
claims this all constituted a conflict of interest and an exces-
sive fee. 
As to the conflict of interest, appellant ended up 
trapped by the Bar's instruction to his client. Initially, he 
thought there was no conflict and, even if so, he thought he had 
his client's consent. At the point in time when he learnej 
otherwise, he was counsel of record charged with the ethical and 
legal obligation to continue representing Mrs. Behunin' s company 
in a matter that had been set for trial until arrangements had 
been made that would insure no prejudice by his withdrawal. He 
met with his client to clarify the matter but the Bar inter-
ferred and eliminated communications to him which would have 
resolved the alleged conflict. The "conflict" promptly ended 
when, several months later, he was informed that new counsel had 
been retained. As soon as he learned that Mrs. Behunin had made 
up her mind to discharge him, he withdrew and the conflict, if 
it ever existed, promptly was terminated. At most, appellant 
continued representing the company when it was not clear in his 
mind whether or not he had his client's consent to the continued 
dual representation. 
wise since he was 
However, he had little choice to do othe~ 
counsel of 
The "conflict" would have been 
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the dilemma avoided had Mrs. Behunin ignored the Bar's instruc-
tion at an earlier date and informed the appellant of her de-
cision. 
As to the nonrefundable retainer and flat fee, the dis-
pute is more properly for courts than Bar Commissioners. As 
noted previously, if a court found that appellant remained able 
to render the contracted for service, he is entitled to the en-
tire contract price upon his wrongful discharge. The factual 
dispute as to whether or not Mrs. Behunin consented to appel-
lant's representation of Mr. Burr would likely determine if 
appellant remained able to render the services for which Mrs. 
Behunin contracted. The Bar converts what is really a contract 
dispute into a charge that keeping the whole $5,000 after ter-
mination of the relationship is improper. The Bar ignores the 
possibility that, if confronted with the issue, a court of law 
just might find that Mrs. Behunin improperly terminated the 
appellant and thereby breached the contract. 
Moreover, at this point in time, the law is less than 
clear as to the proper area of concern for a bar association in 
connection with fees charged by individual lawyers. The Supreme 
Court of the United States recently held that a minimum fee 
schedule promulgated by a bar association was price fixing- in 
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Goldfarb v. Virginia 
_§_tate_Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). If the Utah State Bar has some 
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idea that flat fees or nonrefundable retainers are improper, it 
should, at least, announce that policy in advance. To condemn 
appellant to a one year suspension for a flat fee or a nonre-
fundable retainer smacks of an ~~_QQ~!:_factQ application of bar 
policy. Prominent attorneys throughout the United States often 
require a nonrefundable retainer before they will take on a 
matter for a new client. If nonrefundable retainers are to be 
outlawed, only the most prestigious lawyers in this state will 
be affected by the ruling. Similarly, flat fees, including 
therein all out-of-pocket expense, are not atypical in this 
community. They are most 
clients in criminal matters. 
often utilized by lawyers defending 
If flat fees or nonrefundable re-
tainers are to be condemned by the Utah State Bar, all of the 
lawyers in this state should have notice of that fact in advance 
of disciplinary proceedings against any one of them. Common 
usage may not make a fee practice proper, but it certainly seems 
harsh to declare for the first time that what is a common prac-
tice is dee:ned improper; and, at the very same time, suspend a 
lawyer who engaged in that common practice. A notice to the 
effect that continuance of the practice would result in dis-
ciplinary action would seem much more appropriate. 
Suspension of a lawyer for a period of one year is a 
harsh and severe penalty to exact. Appellant's prospective loss 
of income involves many thousands of dollars, and the injury to 
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his reputation and his standing in the community cannot be 
measured.* 
Conflicts of interest are not unusual in this community 
or elsewhere. It is unusual to think, however, that a lawyer 
risks suspension for one year every time he begins representing 
someone who, in an unrelated matter, sued one of his clients. 
This is especially the case where he believes the first client 
consented to the second representation. 
Assuming, ~!:E.1:!_~.QdO, that appellant did have a conflict 
of interest in violation of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bili ty and assuming, ~rguendo, that appellant charged an ex-
cessive fee, under all of the facts and circumstances of this 
case, it is unconscionable to suggest that appellant should be 
disciplined by suspension for a period of one year. The recom-
mendation of the Board of Commissioners is unreasonable and ex-
cessive. It reflects prejudice and jealousy, not true concern 
with any danger to the public occasioned by the appellant's 
conduct. 
* An example of the extent of the moral turpitude required for 
suspension of one year is In_r:~_t:!acfarlane, 10 Utah 2d 217, 350 
P.2d 631 (1960). In that case, an attorney received a one year 
suspension for exercising undue influence on a 60 year old woman 
(with a mentality of a 12 year old) to include himself in wi~ls 
and codicils prepared by him for 1/3 of her estate or $285,000. 
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CONCLUSION 
--------
Appellant has not been accorded a fair hearing. The 
letter which the corporation wrote to the Bar complained of the 
conflict but not of the fee and sought advice from the Bar. 
Appellant was never afforded a hearing before the Screening 
Committee on the precise charges which were contained in the 
for'1lal Complaint. When he moved to remand the matter to the 
Screening Committee, his motion was improperly denied. More-
over, the Complaint did not charge appellant with the specific 
violations which were later found by the Hearing Committee. A~ 
pellant had no notice of these charges and no opportunity to 
properly defend himself. Appellant has been denied due process 
of law, the benefit of the Utah statutes concerning the discip-
line of lawyers and the rights protected by the Bar's own 
disciplinary rules. The Bar's Hearing Committee evidenced a 
total lack of impartiality; they denied fundamental due process, 
they engaged in debate with the accused, they indulged in spec-
ulative findings, they accepted every simple piece of evidence 
offerred against the appellant, they rejected everything he said 
unless it could be used against him, and they recommended the 
most severe penalty which their one-sided, speculative findings 
could support. The Findings and Conclusions of the Bar are not 
supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indeed, they are in 
large part not supported at all and are clearly erroneous. 
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Moreover, the Board of Commissioners did not consider the evi-
dence in making its Order Recommending Suspension. 
Beyond all of the defects which are fatal to the Order, 
the Recommendation contained therein is simply unreasonable and 
excessive in light of the facts of this case. The Findings of 
Fact and the Conclusions of the Hearing Committee which were 
adopted by the Bar should be reversed. The Order Recommending 
Suspension should be rejected by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Gerald R. Miller 
E. Scott Savage 
Alan L. Sullivan 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP 
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